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In this paper we extend the representative agent model of the consumer to in-
corporate durable consumption goods that generate status, where status depends on
relative consumption. The analysis is done in the neoclassical context. In the closed
economy framework both endogenous and ￿xed employment cases are considered. A
small open economy version of the model is also developed. We derive the intertem-
poral equilibria and establish that in all instances they are saddlepoint stable. Among
our principle results, we show in the closed economy context with endogenous work
eﬀort that an increase in the degree of status preference raises durable consumption,
its stock, employment, and physical capital. These results extend, in general, to the
small open economy.
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Interactions between individuals and economy-wide aggregates or social groups are a per-
vasive phenomenon. Recent researchers who have explored this aspect of economic life with
respect to an individual￿s social status and welfare include Easterlin (1974, 1995), Clark
and Oswald (1996), Oswald (1997), and Frank (1997), to name just a few. One aspect of
this question that has drawn increasing attention in the last decade or so is the issue of
how social status aﬀects overall economic performance, including its implications for the
long-run rate of economic growth and potential public policy interventions. Examining the
recent literature in this area, we observe that there are two primary ways in which status
is modelled in macroeconomic settings. The ￿rst approach, represented by authors such
as Gal· ı (1994), Persson (1995), Harbaugh (1996), Rauscher (1997b), Grossmann (1998),
Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), and Fisher and Hof (2000a, b) speci￿es that status arises
from an individual￿s comparison￿in terms of his instantaneous preferences￿of his own
consumption to some economy-wide measure of aggregate or average consumption, which
can be modelled as an agent￿s consumption relative to this macroeconomic variable. The
second approach, adopted by Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001a, 2001b), Rauscher (1997a),
Futagami and Shibata (1998), Fisher (2004a, 2004b), and Hof and Wirl (2002) speci￿es
that status arises from an agent￿s stock of relative wealth, which can consist of durable
physical capital, ￿nancial assets, or both.
In this paper, we assume that social status is generated by relative consumption,a si n
the ￿rst approach, but specify, as in the second approach, that it depends on a stock vari-
able, here the stock of durable consumption. To our knowledge, this is an extension that has
not been undertaken in the existing literature. Given the importance of durable consump-
tion for countries such as the United States, this seems to us a worthwhile exercise.1 The
speci￿c form of durable consumption we adopt has been developed by Mansoorian (1998)
in his study of the implications of durability for the dynamics of the current account.2
The present work is also related to the approach used by Carrol, et. al. (1997, 2000) in
1A c c o r d i n gt oO b s t f e l da n dR o g o ﬀ (1996), spending on durables accounted for 18.1% of overall con-
sumption spending in 1994.
2Mansoorian (2000) extends this work by considering the implications of commercial policy. In Mat-
suyama (1990) the stock housing is the durable consumption good.
1their endogenous growth models, which assume that agents compare current consumption
to some measure of past consumption history, or ￿habits.￿3
The modelling framework in which we conduct this exercise is otherwise standard. It
is in the general category of the neoclassical Ramsey framework that assumes in￿nitely-
lived consumer-producers. We consider both closed and small open economy models in this
study. Moreover, in our closed economy setting, similar to that employed by Fisher and Hof
(2000b), we analyze the implications of a status preference for durable consumption in both
endogenous and ￿xed employment speci￿cations. In considering implications of changes in
agents attitudes toward relative social position, we also employ a speci￿c parameterization
of instantaneous preferences used by Rauscher (1997b), among others.
The small open economy framework we develop is based on the speci￿cations of Bhan-
dari, et. al. (1990), Fisher (1995), and Fisher and Terrell (2000). These speci￿cations
assume an otherwise ￿small￿ open economies that cannot freely borrow or lend at the
prevailing world interest rate. Rather, they are subject to an upward-sloping interest rate
relationship that implies that the interest rate the country can borrow from the interna-
tional capital market rises with the level of national indebtedness. Among the advantages
of this framework, it generates, as in the closed economy cases, a fourth-order diﬀerential
equation system that possesses a saddlepoint, which facilitates comparisons between the
closed and open economies.
Among our principle results, we derive the intertemporal equilibria of the closed and
open economies, including their dynamics, show that they are all of a fourth order, and
establish that the corresponding steady states are saddlepoints. In terms of the closed
economy model we consider particular two issues: i) the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e g r e e
of status preference on the steady-state equilibrium with endogenous employment and ii)
the implications in the special case of ￿xed employment of increase in the importance
of relative social position on speeds of intertemporal adjustment.4 Regarding the ￿rst
question, we ￿nd that an increase in the degree of status preference raises the long-run
levels of durable consumption, its corresponding stock, employment, and the physical
3Mansoorian (1998, 2000) also incorporates habits (of durable consumption) in his work.
4Since the Jacobian matrices of these models have two negative eigenvalues, they possess two distinct
￿speeds￿ of stable transitional adjustment.
2capital stock (and, thus, steady-state output). These results represent an extension of the
Fisher and Hof (2000b) ￿ndings to the case of durable relative consumption.5 With regard
to the second issue, we ￿nd that whether the speeds of adjustment rise or fall depends
on whether the rise in the degree of status preference raises or lowers the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution. Finally, we show that the long-run implications of an increase in
status considerations are generally extend to the small open economy model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the closed economy
model with durable consumption and derives its intertemporal equilibrium. The ￿rst part
of section 2 outlines the general framework with endogenous employment, while the sec-
ond part of section 2 discusses the implication for the economy￿s speed of adjustment in
the special case of ￿xed employment. In section 3 we develop the small open economy
framework and analyze its dynamic and long-run properties. The paper closes with a brief
conclusion and a mathematical appendix that contains some results that are important
for our subsequent analysis.
2. The Model and Intertemporal Equilibrium
2.1. Variable Employment
We assume that the decentralized economy is populated by a large number of identi-
cal, in￿nitely-lived consumer-producers.6 Without loss of generality, we specify that the
population is constant. In this framework, agents derive positive utility from aggregate
consumer durables, c + a, and status, s. In contrast, work eﬀort, l, yields disutility. We
assume that durable consumption and status are additively separable from work eﬀort in
the instantaneous utility function. Aggregate consumer durables consist of current goods
purchased at time t, c, and the inherited stock of consumer durables, a. For expositional
convenience, we refer to c as durable consumption and to a as its stock. In this continuous-
5Among other results, Fisher and Hof (2000b) show that an increase in the degree of status preference
increases the steady-state values of non-durable consumption, employment, and physical capital.
6We abstract from a public sector in this model, which means that we do address the question of optimal
policy in the context durable consumption externalities. We leave this issue for future work.





and accumulates according to:
œ a = c − δa (2.1b)
where δ is the rate of depreciation of consumer durables.7 We specify that each agent pos-
sesses the following general instantaneous utility function over own durable consumption,
c + a, and status, s,a n dw o r ke ﬀort l:
U(c + a,s)+V (l), (2.2)
where U and V have the following properties:
Uc > 0,U s > 0,U cc < 0,U ss ≤ 0,U ccUss − U2
cs ≥ 0,V 0 < 0,V 00 < 0,
(2.3a)
UscUc − UsUcc > 0, (2.3b)
lim
c→0
Uc(c, s)=∞,l i m
c→∞Uc(c, s)=0 . (2.3c)
According to (2.3a), the representative agent derives positive, though diminishing, mar-
ginal utility from own consumption and positive and non-increasing marginal utility from
status, with the instantaneous utility function U jointly concave in c and s.8 In addition,
work eﬀort generates disutility and V is concave. The condition (2.3b) imposes normality
on preferences, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of status for consumption, Us/Uc,d e -
7This speci￿cation of durable consumption is found in Mansoorian (1998, 2000).
8We use the following notational conventions. In general, we suppress a variable￿s time dependence,
i.e., x ≡ x(t). The time derivative of x will be denoted by œ x; a steady-state value by ￿ x.U n l e s so t h e r w i s e
indicated, the partial derivative of a function F with respect to x will be denoted by Fx, while ￿primes￿
indicate that the derivative of a function of a single variable is being taken.
4pends positively on c, while (2.3c) describes the limiting behavior of the marginal utility of
consumption. Regarding status, we assume that it depends positively on relative durable






,s 0 > 0,s 00 ≤ 0, (2.4)
where C + A is the average (or aggregate) level of durable consumption in the economy.







(c + s)2 < 0. (2.5)
This condition guarantees that there exists a negative relationship between the (￿ow) of
durable consumption goods and its shadow value. Finally, the agent possesses a constant
returns to scale production function that satis￿es the following standard neoclassical prop-
erties of positive and diminishing marginal physical productivity in capital, k,a n dl a b o r ,
l:9
y = F(k,l); Fk > 0,F kk < 0,F l > 0,F ll < 0, (2.6)
where y represents output. In addition, the consumer-producer accumulates physical cap-
ital according to:10
œ k = F(k,l) − c. (2.7)
9The constant returns of scale property implies that the production function obeys the following rela-
tionships:
Fkl > 0,F kkFll = F
2
kl,F kkFl − FklFk = Fkk(y/l),F klFl − FllFk = Fkl(y/l).
10To keep the exposition of the model as simple as possible, we do not specify that physical capital is
subject to depreciation. It would, of course, be straightforward to do so, although none of our qualitative
results would be aﬀected.
















œ a = c − δa, (2.8b)
œ k = F(k,l) − c, (2.8c)
and the initial stocks of durable consumption and physical capital, a(0) = a0 > 0a n d
k(0) = k0 > 0, where β is the exogenous rate of time preference. To solve the consumer-








+ V (l)+φ(c − δa)+￿[F(k,l) − c], (2.9)
where φ and ￿ are the costate variables corresponding, respectively, to the constraints
(2.8b) and (2.8c). Maximizing equation (2.9), we calculate the following ￿rst order opti-
mality conditions:
Uc [c + a,s(z)] +
Us [c + a,s(z)]s0 (z)
C + A
= ￿ − φ, (2.10a)
V 0(l)=−￿Fl (k,l), (2.10b)
œ φ =( β + δ)φ − Uc [c + a,s(z)] −
Us [c + a,s(z)]s0 (z)
C + A
, (2.10c)
œ ￿ = ￿[β − Fk(k,l)]. (2.10d)
The optimality conditions (2.10a)￿(2.10d) have a straightforward interpretation. Equation
6(2.10a) is the ￿rst order condition for own consumption in which the agent takes the
average level of durable consumption in the economy, C + A, as given in performing
his optimization. This is also the case in equation (2.10c), which describes the dynamics
shadow value φ when the stock of own durable consumption goods a is chosen optimally.
Equation (2.10b) is a standard ￿rst order condition for work eﬀort in the neoclassical
context, while equation (2.10d) de￿nes the dynamics of the shadow value ￿ when physical
capital k is chosen optimally. Our speci￿cation of preferences in equations (2.3a)￿(2.3b)
guarantees that the Hamiltonian (2.9) is jointly concave in the control variables c and l
and the state variables a and k. This implies that if the limiting transversality conditions
limt→∞ aφe−βt = limt→∞ k￿e−βt = 0 hold, then necessary conditions (2.10a)￿(2.10d) are
suﬃcient for optimality.
As is the usual practise in models of the type, we restrict our subsequent analysis to
symmetric equilibria in which identical agents make identical choices. This is the procedure
followed by Gal· ı (1994), Persson (1995), Harbaugh (1996), Rauscher (1997b), Grossmann
(1998), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), and Fisher and Hof (2000a, b), among others. In
the context of our model, we specify that the individual quantities of durable consump-
tion (current ￿ows and aggregate stocks) equal their average levels, i.e., c + a ≡ C + A.
Substituting this relationship into (2.10a) and combining with (2.10c), we obtain:
Uc[c + a,s(1)] +
Us [c + a,s(1)]s0 (1)
c + a
= ￿ − φ =( β + δ)φ − œ φ, (2.11)
where the optimality conditions for work eﬀort and capital accumulation remain un-
changed.
Using (2.11) and (2.10b), it is straightforward to calculate the following instantaneous
solutions for consumption and work eﬀort in terms of the state and costate variables:
c = c(a,￿,φ); ca < 0,c ￿ = −cφ < 0, (2.12a)
l = l(k,￿); lk > 0,l ￿ > 0, (2.12b)
where the expressions for the partial derivatives are given in the appendix. The partial
7derivatives in (2.12a, b) are interpreted as follows: an increase in stock of durable con-
sumption a lowers its current level c. Indeed, as we show in the appendix, an increase in a
lowers c by one-for-one. In addition, current durable consumption depends negatively the
marginal utility of wealth ￿ and positively on the shadow value of the stock of durable
consumption φ. Regarding the short-run response of work eﬀort, (2.12b) indicates an in-
crease in the shadow value ￿ raises work eﬀort. Moreover, a given increase in the capital
stock k also encourages labor supply, since Fkl > 0, which is implied by constant returns
to scale production technology.
From the equations (2.11), (2.8b), (2.10d) and (2.8c), we state the independent dy-
namics of the economy:
œ φ =( 1+β + δ)φ − ￿, (2.13a)
œ a = c(a,￿,φ) − δa, (2.13b)
œ ￿ = ￿[β − Fk (k,l(￿,k))], (2.13c)
œ k = F [(k,l(￿,k)) − c(a,￿,φ)], (2.13d)
where we have substituted for l = l(k,￿) in (2.13c, d) and c = c(a,￿,φ) in (2.13b, d),
respectively. Letting œ φ = œ a = œ ￿ = œ k = 0, the long-run equilibrium equals:
Uc [(1 + δ)￿ a,s(1)] +
Us [(1 + δ)￿ a,s(1)]s0 (1)
(1 + δ)￿ a
=( β + δ)￿ φ, (2.14a)














= δ￿ a, (2.14d)
where ￿ c = δ￿ a and ￿ ￿ =( 1+β + δ) ￿ φ. Equations (2.14a, b) are the steady-state versions
of the ￿rst order conditions (2.10a, b), while equation (2.14c) is the standard long-run
representation of the Euler equation, which implies, given our technological assumptions,





is pinned-down by the exogenous rate of time preference β. Finally, due to the fact that
there is no depreciation of physical capital in this model, equation (2.14d) states that
steady-state output equals steady-state durable consumption, which corresponds to the
long-run level of durable goods deprecation.
Linearizing the diﬀerential equation system (2.13a)￿(2.13d) about the steady state
(2.14a)￿(2.14d), we calculate the fourth-order matrix equation:
œ z = Jz =












      

(1 + β + δ)0 −10
−c￿ −(1 + δ) c￿ 0
00 −l￿￿ ￿Fkl −￿ ￿(Fkk + Fkllk)
c￿ 1 Fll￿ − c￿ β + Fllk

      


      

φ − ￿ φ
a − ￿ a
￿ − ￿ ￿
k − ￿ k

      
 (2.15)
where z =( φ,a,￿,k,)
0and J denotes the Jacobian matrix of (2.15) in the case of endoge-
nous employment. Observe that functions of variables are evaluated at the steady-state
equilibrium (2.14a)￿(2.14d). To determine the stability properties of the equilibrium, we
￿rst consider the trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix
tr(J)=ω1 + ω2 + ω3 + ω4 =2 β − l￿￿ ￿Fkl + Fllk =2 β > 0,
det(J)=ω1ω2ω3ω4





9where ωi =1−4a r et h ee i g e n v a l u e so fJ.11 The condition tr(J) > 0 rules out the case of
four negative eigenvalues, while det(J) > 0 implies that the following cases do not obtain:
i) one negative and three positive eigenvalues; and ii) three negative and one positive
eigenvalue. This leaves the cases that are not ruled-out by tr(J) > 0a n dd e t( J) > 0: i)
two negative and two positive eigenvalues; and ii). four positive eigenvalues. To determine
which of the two cases holds, we use the fact that the characteristic equation, denoted by
det(J−ωI) = 0, can be factored as:
det(J−ωI)=( ω − ω1)(ω − ω2)(ω − ω3)(ω − ω4)
= ω4 − tr(J)ω3 +( ω1ω2 + ω1ω3 + ω1ω4 + ω2ω3 + ω2ω4 + ω3ω4)ω2
−(ω1ω2ω3 + ω1ω2ω4 + ω1ω3ω4 + ω2ω3ω4)ω +d e t( J)=0 . (2.16a)
Calculating det(J−ωI)f r o m( 2 . 1 5 ) ,w e￿nd:
det(J−ωI)=
ω4 − tr(J)ω3 +
n
β2 − (1 + δ)(1 + β + δ) −
h







(1 + δ)(1 + β + δ)+
h




ω +d e t( J)=0 .
(2.16b)
Matching the coeﬃcients of (2.16a, b), we observe that:
ω1ω2ω3 + ω1ω2ω4 + ω1ω3ω4 + ω2ω3ω4
= −β
n
(1 + δ)(1 + β + δ)+
h





11In calculating tr(J)=2 β, we substitute for l￿ and lk in the expression for tr(J). In deriving detJ > 0,
we use the fact that








V 00 +￿ ￿Fll
< 0,
and substitute for FkkFll = F
2
kl and (Fklβ − FkkFl)=−Fkk(￿ y/￿ l).
10which implies that we can rule out the case in which all the eigenvalues are positive. Thus,
the equilibrium of (2.15) is a saddlepoint with two negative and two positive eigenvalues
ordered according to:
ω1 < ω2 < 0 < ω3 < ω4.
Using standard methods, we can solve (2.15) for the paths of (φ,a,￿,k). This procedure
is outlined in the appendix. While a detailed analysis of the solution paths of (φ,a,￿,k)
is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future work, the methods used by Eicher
a n dT u r n o v s k y( 2 0 0 1 )c a nb ee m p l o y e dt od os o .
We next investigate the implications of status preference on the long-run equilibrium
o ft h ee c o n o m y .T od os o ,w ec h o o s eac o n v e n i e n ts p e c i ￿cation of U(c + a,s), similar to
that employed by Rauscher (1997), in which own consumption (inclusive of its durable
stock) is additively separable from status:12
U(c + a,s)=( 1− γ)






, γ > 0, η > 0.
(2.17)
We interpret the parameter η as a measure of the ￿importance￿ of status for consumer-
producers, or the as the ￿degree￿ of status preference. Under the speci￿cation (2.17), the
steady-state condition (2.14a) becomes:
[(1 + δ)￿ a]
−γ +
ηs0(1)
(1 + δ)￿ a
=( β + δ)￿ φ. (2.14a0)
Diﬀerentiating (2.14a0) and (2.14b)￿(2.14d) with respect to η, we calculate the following
long-run comparative statics expressions for
‡










(1 + δ)￿ a∆
> 0, (2.18a)
12Rauscher (1997) restricts his attention to non-durable consumption. In addition, we retain in this part
of the paper the general speci￿cation of the disutility of work eﬀort V (l) stated in (2.2) and (2.3a). The
conditions γ > 0, η > 0, in (2.17) guarantee c￿ < 0, which is a suﬃcient condition, given the other model














s0(1)(1 + β + δ)FkkFl(￿ y/￿ l)










s0 (1)δ(1 + β + δ)FklFl













∆ =( β + δ)δV 00Fkk − (1 + β + δ)Fl
•
γ [(1 + δ)￿ a]
−(1+γ) +
ηs0(1)
(1 + δ)￿ a2
‚
Fkk(￿ y/￿ l) > 0.
The signs of the expressions in (2.18a)￿(2.18c) can be directly explained: a higher weight on
status considerations causes consumer-producers to place a greater value on consumption
at the expense of leisure, which is re￿ected in (2.18a) in the higher long-run levels of ￿ ￿ and
￿ φ. This leads, in turn, to an increase in work eﬀort ￿ l,w h i c h ,s i n c eFkl > 0, causes physical
capital ￿ k to accumulate. Nevertheless, the steady-state capital-labor ratio ￿ κ,d e t e r m i n e db y
t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eβ and the curvature of the production function, is independent,
according to (2.18c), of changes in the status preference parameter η. The long-run rise
in output ￿ y leads, as indicated in (2.18b), to an increase in durable consumption ￿ c and its
steady-state stock ￿ a. Our results represent, then, an extension of those of Fisher and Hof
(2000b), who in their model non-durable consumption show that ￿status consciousness￿
leads to ￿too much￿ consumption, work eﬀort, and physical capital accumulation relative
to a socially planned economy in which status considerations do not play a role.14
2.2. Fixed Employment Case
In order to explore in greater detail the dynamic properties of the durable consumption
model, we simplify the framework by assuming that employment ￿xed. The description
of the ￿xed employment version of the model, along with its optimality conditions and





14See Fisher and Hof (2000b) proposition 1 and section 4, pp. 10-12. In the context of our model, the
social planner would set c + a = C + A, implying that (2.17) becomes:
U(c + a,s)=( 1− γ)
−1 (c + a)
1−γ + ηs(1), γ > 0, η > 0.
In this case there is no relative consumption externality arising from status preference.
12intertemporal equilibrium, is given below in the appendix. Examining the steady-state
system in (A7a)￿(A7c), it is clear that the per-capita values of
‡
￿ c,￿ a,￿ k
·
are independent of
the parameters of the instantaneous utility function U (c + a,s). Indeed, they are solely a
function, as in the standard neoclassical framework without status preference, of the time
rate of preference β and the properties of the per-capita production function y = f(k).
With respect to the steady-state equilibrium, shifts in the status parameter η only in￿uence
the values of the costate variables ￿ ￿ and ￿ φ.15 Nevertheless, changes in the importance that
status consciousness individuals place on the relative consumption of durable goods do
aﬀect, through their in￿uence on the values of c￿ and ￿ ￿, the stable speeds of adjustment
of the economy toward steady-state equilibrium. Investigating the relationship between η
and the stable eigenvalues, denoted ψ1 and ψ2 in the special case of ￿xed employment, is
the focus in this part of the paper.
To do so, we choose the following very simple numerical parameterization of the neo-
classical economy with durable goods:
β =0 .04, δ =0 .10,y = k0.36. (2.19a)
Substituting these values in the steady-state equilibrium conditions (A7b, c), we obtain
the solutions for the long-run stocks of physical capital and durable goods and the (￿ow)
of durable consumption (=output):
￿ k =3 1 .0, ￿ a =3 4 .4, ￿ c =￿ y =3 .44. (2.19b)
In this exercise we retain the parameterized functional form for U(c+a,s) given in (2.17)
and specify two alternative values of the preference parameter γ: γ =2 .5a n dγ =0 .4.16










(β + δ)(1+δ)￿ a
> 0.
16The available empirical evidence supports an estimate of γ that is closer to 2.5t o0 .4.
13According to (2.17), the expressions for c￿ and ￿ ￿ correspond to:
c￿ = −
n
γ [(1 + δ)￿ a]




(1 + β + δ)
(β + δ)
‰
[(1 + δ)￿ a]
−γ +
ηs0(1)
(1 + δ)￿ a
￿
(2.20)
To calculate the stable eigenvalues ψ1 and ψ2, we substitute (2.19a, b)￿(2.20), along
with the other relevant parameter values, into the appropriate elements of the Ja-
cobian matrix for the ￿xed employment economy, denoted by J
￿ l.W et h e nc a l c u l a t e
the eigenvalues of J
￿ l, permitting the status parameter take on the following values:
η =( 0 .0,0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8,1.0). The results are given in Tables 1a and 1b, where we re-
port the absolute values, and, hence, the speeds of adjustment, of the stable eigenvalues,
| ψ1 | and | ψ2 |.17 We ￿n di nT a b l e1 af o rt h ec a s eγ =2 .5t h a tg r e a t e rv a l u e so fη lead to
faster stable speeds of adjustment, although after η =0 .4, these increases are negligible.
In contrast, in Table 1b for the case γ =0 .4 higher values of the status parameter η result
in slower speeds of stable adjustment, although, as in Table 1a, the changes in | ψ1 | and
| ψ2 | fall after η =0 .4. The reason for the distinct responses in Tables 1a and 1b is that
increases in η have opposite eﬀects on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution￿and,
thus, on the stable speeds of adjustment￿depending on the value of the preference para-
meter γ. If consumer-producers have instantaneous preferences described by (2.17), then
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, denoted by σ = σ(c + a), is equal to:18
σ(c + a)=−
(β + δ)c￿￿ ￿
(1 + β + δ)(1+δ)￿ a
=
(c + a)
−γ +( c + a)
−1 ηs0(1)
h
γ (c + a)




17All numerical simulations are performed using Mathematica 4.1.
18If status depends on relative consumption, Fisher and Hof (2000a) show that the formula for the




c[Vcc(c,1) + c−1Vcz(c,1) − c−2Vz(c,1)]
where U(c,C)=V (c,z), z ≡ c/C and C is the aggregate level of (non-durable) consumption. In (2.21) we
apply this expression to our speci￿cation in which consumption is a durable good.




= sgn(γ − 1),
which implies that if γ > 1, (resp. γ < 1), then an increase in η raises (resp. lowers)
σ(c+a) and, thus, the stable speeds of adjustment, consistent with the numerical results
in Tables 1a and 1b.
3. Small Open Economy Equilibrium
In this section of the paper we extend the model and its equilibrium properties to the
small open economy context.19 While we assume that the preference structures in (2.2)￿
(2.5) are the same as in the closed economy speci￿cation, we alter the model in two
important ways. The ￿rst modi￿cation of the model is to assume that the small open
economy has an upward-sloping supply function of debt. This speci￿cation, which is used
by authors such as Bhandari, Haque, and Turnovsky (1990), Fisher (1995), and Fisher
and Terrell (2000), states that open economies, otherwise satisfying the ￿small country￿
assumption, cannot freely borrow or lend at the prevailing world interest rate r∗. Instead,
re￿ecting the imperfect substitutability of domestic and foreign assets, the interest rate
on domestic assets, denoted by rn(n), rises as the national indebtedness of the country
increases. Letting the variable n denote the stock of international debt, the domestic
interest rate relationship is given as:
rn(n)=r∗ + α(n), α0 > 0, α00 > 0, (3.1)
where the convex function α(n) can be considered a country-speci￿c￿ c o s t ￿o r￿ r i s k
premium.￿20 The reason why we incorporate (3.1) into our durable consumption model is
19In the open economy durable consumption goods are traded at a unitary price.
20For convenience, we assume throughout this section of the paper that the small open economy is always
a net debtor, i.e., n>0, ∀t ≥ 0. An alternative speci￿cation of (3.1) would scale the level of indebtedness
by the ability to pay, measured, for example, by the level of output.
15because it generates interior intertemporal equilibria with saddlepath dynamics.21 More-
over, incorporating (3.1), together with durable consumption goods, into the neoclassical
small open economy model yields a fourth-order diﬀerential equation system, as in the
case of our closed economy model. This characteristic makes our closed and open economy
speci￿cations more directly comparable.
The other modi￿cation of the basic model is the assumption that employment l is
the sole factor of production so that: y = F(l), F0 > 0, F00 < 0. The reason why we
abstract from physical capital in the small open economy extension is for the sake of
analytical tractability and because its dynamic behavior, in the absence of specifying an
installation-cost, Tobin￿s q framework for physical capital, is not particularly revealing.22
Taken together, these two modi￿cations imply that the accumulation of net debt is given
by
œ n = rn(n)n + c − F(l)( 3 . 2 )
where, as before c is the level of current durable goods. The consumer-producer￿s maxi-


















œ a = c − δa (3.3b)
21The recent papers of Fisher and Hof (2003) and Fisher (2004a) have an extensive discussion of the
conditions required for the small open economy to possess interior equilibria, particularly the circumstances
in which an interior equilibrium is attained without imposing equality between the world interest rate and
the domestic rate of time preference, r
∗ = β. This issue is also addressed in the standard references of
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), ch. 2, and Turnovsky (1997), chs. 2 and 3.
22It is straightforward to show that the condition β = r
∗ must be imposed for the small economy Ramsey
model, in the absence of other modi￿cations, to achieve an interior steady state and possess saddlepath
dynamics. If the domestic economy also possesses physical capital k, then this condition implies that k
is always at its steady-state value. In terms of our model with durable consumption goods, it can be
demonstrated that the only variables that exhibit non-degenerate dynamics are the stock of consumer
durables a and the stock of net debt n. All other variables always equal their steady-state values.
16œ n = rn(n)n + c − F(l) (3.3c)
and the No￿Ponzi-Game condition limt→∞ ne−rnt ≥ 0, together with the initial stocks of
durable consumption and net debt: a(0) = a0 > 0, n(0) = n0 > 0. The current-value








+ V (l)+φ(c − δa)+￿[rn(n)n + c − F(l)] (3.4)
where ￿ now corresponds to the shadow value of international assets. As in the closed-
economy framework, consumers make their choices taking the aggregate levels of durable
goods and their stocks as given. Furthermore, agents make their consumption/savings
decision holding the interest rate on bonds rn(n) constant. This implies that the ￿rst
order conditions are equal to the following expressions
Uc [c + a,s(z)] +
Us [c + a,s(z)]s0 (1)
C + A
= ￿ − φ, (3.5a)
V 0(l)=−￿F0(l) (3.5b)
œ φ =( β + δ)φ − Uc [c + a,s(z)] −
Us [c + a,s(z)]s0 (1)
C + A
, (3.5c)
œ ￿ = ￿[β − rn(n)] (3.5d)
The optimality conditions (3.5a)￿(3.5c) for the open economy have an interpretation simi-
lar to their counterparts (2.10a)￿(2.10c) for the closed economy. The exception is equation
(3.5d), which describes the optimal path of the shadow value ￿ if the stock of net debt
is chosen optimally. Our speci￿cation of preferences in equations (2.3a)￿(2.3b) guaran-
tees that the Hamiltonian (3.4) is jointly concave in the control variables c and l and
the state variables a and n. This implies that if the limiting transversality conditions
limt→∞ aφe−βt = limt→∞ n￿e−βt = 0 hold, then necessary conditions (3.5a)￿(3.5d) are
17suﬃcient for optimality.
As in the closed economy model, we restrict the analysis to symmetric equilibria in
which identical agents make identical choices, implying, c + a ≡ C + A. Substituting this
relationship into (3.5a) and combining with (3.5c), we obtain:
Uc [c + a,s(1)] +
Us [c + a,s(1)]s0 (1)
c + a
= ￿ − φ =( β + δ)φ − œ φ (3.6)
which repeats equation (2.11). The optimality conditions for work eﬀort and international
borrowing in the symmetric state remain unchanged.
Consequently, the independent dynamics of the small open economy model corresponds
to the following system of equations
œ φ =( 1+β + δ)φ − ￿ (3.7a)
œ a = c(a,￿,φ) − δa (3.7b)
œ ￿ = ￿[β − rn(n)] (3.7c)
œ n = rn(n)n + c(a,￿,φ) − F [l(￿)] (3.7d)
where we have substituted for c = c(a,￿,φ) in equations (3.7b, 3.7d) and l = l(￿)i n
(3.7d).23 A key distinction between the closed and small open economy models is the ability
of small open economy to borrow (and lend) from abroad. This is re￿e c t e di ne q u a t i o n
(3.7d), which describes the (negative of) the current account balance. It is the diﬀerence
between domestic durable consumption, inclusive of interest service, and domestic output.
Letting œ φ = œ a = œ ￿ = œ n = 0, the long-run equilibrium equals
Uc [(1 + δ)￿ a,s(1)] +
Us [(1 + δ)￿ a,s(1)]s0 (1)
(1 + δ)￿ a
=( β + δ)￿ φ, (3.8a)
23This instantaneous consumption function, together with its partial derivatives, is the same as in the




18V 0(￿ l)=−(1 + β + δ) ￿ φF0(￿ l), (3.8b)
rn(￿ n)=r∗ + α(￿ n)=β (3.8c)




= rn(￿ n)￿ n =[ r∗ + α(￿ n)] ￿ n, (3.8d)
where ￿ c = δ￿ a and ￿ ￿ =( 1 + β + δ) ￿ φ.T h e￿rst two steady-state conditions are quite
straightforward: equation (3.8a) describes the long-run ￿rst order condition for own
durable consumption, while equation (3.8b) is the long-run optimality condition for em-
ployment if it is the sole factor of production. In turn, equation (3.8c) describes the
steady-state maximum condition for foreign debt: the real return on debt in steady-state
equilibrium equals the given consumer-producer rate of time preference. Correspondingly,
this condition determines the steady-state stock of debt ￿ n,w h i c hi saf u n c t i o no ft h e
world interest rate r∗, the domestic rate of time preference β, and the curvature of the
￿risk premium￿ function α(•). Finally, equation (3.8d) is the steady-state version of the
current account balance in which the diﬀerence between long-run durable consumption
spending and output equals steady-state interest payments on the outstanding stock of
international debt.
Linearizing (3.7a)￿(3.7d) about the steady-state equilibrium described by (3.8a)￿
(3.8d), we obtain the following matrix diﬀerential equation
œ z = Jsoez =












      

(1 + β + δ)0 −10
−c￿ −(1 + δ) c￿ 0
00 0 −￿ ￿α0
−c￿ −1 −(F0l￿ − c￿) β + α0￿ n

      


      

φ − ￿ φ
a − ￿ a
￿ − ￿ ￿
n − ￿ n

      
 (3.9)
where z =( φ,a,￿,n,)
0and Jsoe denotes the Jacobian matrix in the small open economy
(soe) case. To determine the stability properties of the equilibrium, we ￿rst consider the
19trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix
tr(Jsoe)=θ1 + θ2 + θ3 + θ4 =2 β + α0￿ n>0,
det(Jsoe)=θ1θ2θ3θ4 = ￿α0 £
(1 + β + δ)(1+δ)F0l￿ − (β + δ)δc￿
⁄
> 0,
where θi =1− 4a r et h ee i g e n v a l u e so fJsoe.T h ec o n d i t i o ntr(Jsoe) > 0 rules out the
case of four negative eigenvalues, while det(Jsoe) > 0 eliminates, respectively, the cases
of: i) one negative and three positive eigenvalues; and ii) three negative and one positive
eigenvalue. As in the closed economy framework, we must directly evaluate the character-
istic equation to determine whether Jsoe has: i) two negative and positive eigenvalues; or
ii) four positive eigenvalues. In the small open economy case the characteristic equation,
denoted by det(Jsoe−θI)=0e q u a l s :
det(Jsoe−θI)=
θ4 − tr(Jsoe)θ3 +
£¡
β + α0￿ n
¢






(1 + β + δ)(1 + δ)
¡







θ +d e t( Jsoe)=0
(3.10)
Matching the coeﬃcients of (2.16a) and (3.10), we observe that θ1θ2θ3 +θ1θ2θ4+θ1θ3θ4 +
θ2θ3θ4 = −[(1 + β + δ)(1 + δ)(β + α0￿ n)+￿ ￿α0 (F0l￿ − c￿)β] < 0, which implies that we
can rule out the case in which all the eigenvalues are positive. Thus, the ￿xed-employment
equilibrium of (3.9) is a saddlepoint with two negative and two positive eigenvalues ordered
according to:
θ1 < θ2 < 0 < θ3 < θ4.
We have established that both closed and open economies display saddlepath dynamics.
As in the case of the closed economy, (3.9), using standard procedures, can be solved for
the solutions paths (φ,a,￿,n,). This is done in the last part of the appendix.
We close this part of the paper with an analysis of the impact of an increase in the
degree of status consciousness in the small open economy context. Diﬀerentiating (2.14a0)
20and (3.8b)￿(3.8d) with respect to η, we calculate the following long-run comparative statics
expressions for
‡









s0 (1)α0 (1 + β + δ)
h
V 00 +( 1+β + δ) ￿ φF00
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s0 (1)α0 (1 + β + δ)(F0)2












Γ = −α0 (β + δ)δ
h




γ [(1 + δ)￿ a]
−(1+γ) +
ηs0(1)
(1 + δ)￿ a2
‚
(1 + β + δ)F00F0 < 0.
How do the small open economy results in (3.11a)￿(3.11d) compare to those calculated
in (2.18a)￿(2.18c) for the closed economy case? As in the closed economy framework, a
greater degree of status preference raises the shadow values ￿ φ and ￿ ￿ and causes a long-run
increase in work eﬀort ￿ l, along with durable consumption ￿ c and its aggregate stock ￿ a.
These results, then, represent an extension of the Fisher and Hof (2000b) ￿ndings that an
increase in the degree of status preference leads to a long-run increase in consumption,
work eﬀort, and output to the small open economy. One key distinction between the small
open economy and closed economies is, of course, the ability of the small open economy
to ￿nance its durable consumption by borrowing from abroad. In this model, however,
the steady-state increase in durable consumption is exactly oﬀset by the long-run rise
in domestic output, which implies that there is no change in the steady-state stock of
21debt ￿ n. Of course, the fact that the long-run stock of debt ￿ n is independent of the status
parameter η does not imply a lack of current account dynamics subsequent to an increase
in η. For example, it is straightforward to show, using the solution for n d e r i v e di nt h e
appendix, that the current account, depending on the relative intertemporal dynamics of
durable consumption and output, initially improves (resp. deteriorates) before reaching
at i m et = t∗,s u c ht h a tœ n(t∗) = 0. Afterwards, i.e., for t>t ∗, the current deteriorates
(resp. improves) as the stock of debt returns to its initial and steady-state level, n0 =￿ n,
as t →∞ .24
4. Conclusions
In this paper we study the dynamic properties of neoclassical, representative agent models
of the consumer-producer in which status depends on relative consumption. Our extension
is to model in closed and open economy contexts relative consumption as a durable good.
Among our major results, we derive the optimizing equilibria of the closed and open
economies, including their dynamic properties, show that they are all of a fourth order, and
establish that the corresponding steady states in all cases possess the saddlepoint property.
Using a particular speci￿cation of relative consumption preferences, we investigate the
implications of changing the importance of status considerations. Among our results, we
￿nd: i) an increase in the degree of status preference in the closed economy with endogenous
work eﬀort raises the long-run levels of durable consumption, its corresponding stock,
employment, and physical capital; and ii) an increase in the status preference parameter
aﬀects the stable speeds of adjustment in the special case of ￿xed employment, depending
on whether it raises or lowers the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Finally, the
long-run implications of an increase in status considerations in the small open economy
model are generally similar to those in the closed economy.
24The non-monotonic behavior of the current account re￿ects the fact that it depends on two stable
eigenvalues. Because ￿ n = n0 in response to a (permanent) increase in the status parameter η,t h es o l u t i o n
of n simpli￿es because in (A15b), Q2 = −Q1. From the corresponding expression for n,w ec a ns h o w
œ n(t
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5. Appendix
255.1. Partial Derivatives of (2.12a, b)
Taking the total derivatives of (2.11) and (2.10b), we obtain the expressions for the partial
derivatives of durable consumption and work eﬀort with respect to the model￿s state and
costate variables:
ca = −1,c ￿ = −cφ =
h














V 00 + ￿Fll
> 0. (A1b)
5.2. Solution for (φ,a,￿,k) in the Variable-Employment Economy
The general stable solution to the diﬀerential equation system (2.15) is represented by the
following expressions:
φ = ￿ φ + A1eω1t + A2eω2t (A2a)
a =￿ a + B1eω1t + B2eω2t (A2b)
￿ =￿ ￿ + C1eω1t + C2eω2t (A2c)
k = ￿ k + D1eω1t + D2eω2t (A2d)
where Ai,B i,C i and Di,i=1 ,2 are constants (eigenvectors) corresponding to the stable
eigenvalues ω1 and ω2 and
‡
￿ φ,￿ a, ￿ ￿, ￿ k
·
are the long-run solutions calculated from (2.14a)￿
(2.14d). Since only two of these constant are independent, the ￿r s ts t e pi no b t a i n i n gt h e
complete solution is to solve Ai,B i,C i in terms of Di, i =1 ,2. Using (2.15), (A2a)￿(A2d)
and letting x =( Ai,B i,C i,D i)
0, these relationships are calculated from following the
26homogeneous system:
(J − ωI)x =

      

(1 + β + δ) − ωi 0 −10
−c￿ −[(1 + δ)+ωi] c￿ 0
00 d33 − ωi d34
c￿ 1 d43 d44 − ωi

      




















      
(A3a)
where
d33 = −l￿￿ ￿Fkl > 0,d 34 = −￿ ￿(Fkk + Fkllk) > 0,d 43 = Fll￿−c￿ > 0,d 44 = β+Fllk > 0.
From (A3a), the constants Ai,B i,C i and Di, i =1 ,2a r ew r i t t e na s :
Ai =
Ci



























T os o l v ef o rt h ec o n s t a n t sDi and complete the solution of (A3a), we use the fact that
the stock of durable goods and physical capital evolve continuously from their initial
conditions, a(0) = a0 and k(0) = k0. From (A2b, d) this gives us the two equation system










D2 = a0, ￿ k + D1 + D2 = k0
(A4a)




−(￿ a − a0)+Ω2 (ω2)
(1−Φ(ω2))
Φ(ω2) (￿ k − k0)
i




Φ(ω1)Φ(ω2)(￿ a − a0) − Ω1 (ω1)Φ(ω2)(1 − Φ(ω1))(￿ k − k0)
i
Ω1 (ω1)Φ(ω1)[1− Φ(ω1)] − Ω2 (ω2)Φ(ω1)[1− Φ(ω2)]
. (A4b)
Substitution of equations (A4b) into (A3b) and the resulting expressions into (A2a)￿(A2d)
yield the stable solutions for (φ,a,￿,k) in the endogenous employment case.
5.3. Fixed Employment Equilibrium
If consumer-producers supply a ￿xed (unitary) level of work eﬀort l = ﬂ l, instantaneous
preferences reduce to U = U(c + a,s)+V (ﬂ l), where the conditions (2.2)￿(2.5) obtain.
Furthermore, we can simplify production technology to y = f(k), where y and k now
represent per-capita output and physical capital, respectively, and the following standard
restrictions on f(k)h o l d :f0(k) > 0, f00(k) < 0, f(0) = 0, f(0) = 0, f(k) →∞as k →∞ .
Furthermore, we assume the usual Inada conditions are satis￿ed. It is then straightforward
to demonstrate that the symmetric equilibrium in the ￿xed employment case corresponds
to:
Uc [c + a,s(1)] +
Us [c + a,s(1)]s0 (1)
c + a
= ￿ − φ, (A5a)
œ φ =( β + δ)φ − Uc [c + a,s(1)] −
Us [c + a,s(1)]s0 (1)
c + a
, (A5b)
œ a = c − δa, (A5c)
œ ￿ = ￿[β − f0(k)], (A5d)
œ k = f(k) − c. (A5e)
Equations (A5a)￿(A5c) repeat (2.11) and (2.1b) from the model with endogenous work
eﬀort, while (A5d, e) are the corresponding diﬀerential equations for the capital stock and
its costate variable in the ￿xed employment case. As in the general model with endogenous
28employment, we calculate an instantaneous consumption function c = c(a,￿,φ)f r o m
(A5a), which possesses the same partial derivatives stated above in (A1a).
The equilibrium dynamics of the ￿xed employment model then equals:
œ φ =( 1+β + δ)φ − ￿, (A6a)
œ a = c(a,￿,φ) − δa, (A6b)
œ ￿ = ￿[β − f0(k)], (A6c)
œ k = f(k) − c(a,￿,φ). (A6d)
Letting œ φ = œ a = œ ￿ = œ k = 0, the long-run equilibrium equals
Uc [(1 + δ)￿ a,s(1)] +
Us [(1 + δ)￿ a,s(1)]s0 (1)
(1 + δ)￿ a










= δ￿ a, (A7c)
where ￿ c = δ￿ a and ￿ ￿ =( 1 + β + δ) ￿ φ. Linearizing (A6a)￿(A6d) about the steady-state
equilibrium described by (A7a)￿(A7c), we obtain the following matrix diﬀerential equation:
œ z = J
ﬂ lz =
29











      

(1 + β + δ)0 −10
−c￿ −(1 + δ) c￿ 0
00 0 −￿ ￿f00
c￿ 1 −c￿ β

      


      

φ − ￿ φ
a − ￿ a
￿ − ￿ ￿
k − ￿ k

      

(A8)
where z =( φ,a,￿,k,)
0and J
ﬂ l denotes the Jacobian matrix of (A8) in the ￿xed employment
case. To determine the stability properties of the equilibrium, we ￿rst consider the trace












= ψ1ψ2ψ3ψ4 =( β + δ)δc￿￿ ￿f00 > 0,
where ψi =1− 4a r et h ee i g e n v a l u e so fJ





> 0 rules out the case





> 0 eliminates, respectively, the cases of one
negative and three positive eigenvalues, and three negative and one positive eigenvalue.
As in the more general framework with endogenous employment, we must directly eval-
uate the characteristic equation to determine whether J
ﬂ l has two negative and positive
























=0 ( A 9 )
Matching the coeﬃcients of (2.16a) and (A9), we observe that
ψ1ψ2ψ3 + ψ1ψ2ψ4 + ψ1ψ3ψ4 + ψ2ψ3ψ4 = β[(1 + δ)(1 + β + δ)+c￿￿ ￿f00] < 0,
which implies that we can rule out the case in which all the eigenvalues are positive.
Thus, the ￿xed-employment equilibrium of (A9) is a saddlepoint with two negative and
30two positive eigenvalues ordered according to:
ψ1 < ψ2 < 0 < ψ3 < ψ4.
5.4. Solution for (φ,a,￿,k) in the Fixed-Employment Economy
The general stable solution to the diﬀerential equation system (A9) is represented by the
following expressions:
φ = ￿ φ + E1eψ1t + E2eψ2t (A10a)
a =￿ a + F1eψ1t + F2eψ2t (A10b)
￿ =￿ ￿ + G1eψ1t + G2eψ2t (A10c)
k = ￿ k + L1eψ1t + L2eψ2t (A10d)
where Ei,F i,G i and Li,i=1 ,2 are constants (eigenvectors) corresponding to the stable
eigenvalues ψ1 and ψ2 of the ￿xed employment economy (l = ﬂ l)a n dw h e r e
‡
￿ φ,￿ a, ￿ ￿, ￿ k
·
are
the steady-state solutions derived from the system (A7a)￿(A7c). Since only two of these
constants are independent, the ￿rst step in obtaining the complete solution is to solve
Ei,F i,G i in terms of Li, i =1 ,2. These relationships, using (A8) and (A10a)￿(A10d), are
calculated from the homogeneous system:
(J
ﬂ l − ψI)x
=

      

(1 + β + δ) − ψi 0 −10
−c￿ −[(1 + δ)+ψi] c￿ 0
00 −ψi −￿ ￿f00
c￿ 1 −c￿ β − ψi

      




















      
 (A11a)
31where x =( Ei,F i,G i,L i)
0and where the constants for i =1 ,2a r ew r i t t e na s
Ei =
Gi




































ψi [(1 + δ)+ψi]
,
are the solution coeﬃcients for the ￿xed employment case. To solve for the constants
Li and complete the solution of (A10a)￿(A10d), we use the fact that the stock of durable
goods and physical capital evolve continuously from their initial conditions, a(0) = a0 and
k(0) = k0. From (A10b, d) this gives us the two equation system


















L2 = a0, ￿ k + L1 + L2 = k0,
(A12a)


































ﬂ l(ψ2)(￿ a − a0) − Ω
ﬂ l
1 (ψ1)Φ
ﬂ l(ψ2)[1 − Φ














Substitution of equations (A12b) into (A11b) and the resulting expressions into (A10a)￿
(A10d) yield the stable solutions for (φ,a,￿,k)i nt h e￿xed employment case.
325.5. Solution for (φ,a,￿,n) in the Small Open Economy
The general stable solution to the diﬀerential equation system (3.9a) is represented by the
following expressions:
φ = ￿ φ + M1eθ1t + M2eθ2t (A13a)
a =￿ a + N1eθ1t + N2eθ2t (A13b)
￿ =￿ ￿ + P1eθ1t + P2eθ2t (A13c)
n =￿ n + Q1eθ1t + Q2eθ2t (A13d)
where Mi,N i,P i and Qi,i=1 ,2 are constants (eigenvectors) corresponding to the stable
eigenvalues θ1 and θ2 of the small open economy and where
‡
￿ φ,￿ a, ￿ ￿, ￿ n
·
are the steady-
state solutions derived from the system (3.8a)￿(3.8d). Since only two of these constants
are independent, the ￿rst step in obtaining the complete solution is to solve Mi,N i,P i in
terms of Qi, i =1 ,2. These relationships, using (3.9a) and (A13a)￿(A13d), are calculated
from the homogeneous system:
(Jsoe − θI)x = (14a)

      

(1 + β + δ) − θi 0 −10
−c￿ −[(1 + δ)+θi] c￿ 0
00 −θi −￿ ￿α0
−c￿ −1 −(F0l￿ − c￿)( β + α0￿ n) − θi

      




















      

where x =( Mi,N i,P i,Q i)
0and where the constants in the small open economy (soe) for
i =1 ,2a r ew r i t t e na s :
Mi =
Pi
























Φsoe(θi)=( 1+β + δ) − θi, Ωsoe
i (θi)=
c￿￿ ￿α0
θi [(1 + δ)+θi]
,
are the solution coeﬃcients for the small open economy case. To solve for the constants
Qi and complete the solution of (A13a)￿(A13d), we use the fact that the stock of durable
goods and net debt evolve continuously from their initial conditions, a(0) = a0 and n(0) =
n0. From (A13b, d) this gives us the two equation system












Q2 = a0, ￿ n + Q1 + Q2 = n0,
(A15a)




−(￿ a − a0)+Ωsoe
2 (θ2)
[1−Φsoe(θ2]
Φsoe(θ2) (￿ n − n0)
i
Ωsoe




[Φsoe(θ1)Φsoe(θ2)(￿ a − a0) − Ωsoe
1 (θ1)Φsoe(θ2)[1 − Φsoe(θ1)](￿ n − n0)]
Ωsoe




Substitution of equations (A15b) into (A14b) and the resulting expressions into (A13a)￿
(A13d) yield the stable solutions for (φ,a,￿,n) in the small open economy with an upward-
sloping supply function of debt.
34Table 1a: Eﬀects of the Degree of Status Preference on the Stable Speeds on
Adjustment for γ =2 .5







Table 1b: Eﬀects of the Degree of Status Preference on the Stable Speeds on
Adjustment for γ =0 .4
η | ψ1 || ψ2 |
0.01 .35 0.0516
0.21 .35 0.0509
0.41 .34 0.0502
0.61 .33 0.0496
0.81 .33 0.0491
1.01 .32 0.0485
35